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Secrecy Rate Optimizations for a MISO Secrecy
Channel with Multiple Multi-Antenna
Eavesdroppers
Zheng Chu, Hong Xing, Martin Johnston, and Ste´phane Le Goff
Abstract— This paper investigates secrecy rate optimiza-
tion problems for a multiple-input-single-output (MISO) secrecy
channel in the presence of multiple multi-antenna eavesdrop-
pers. Specifically, we consider power minimization and secrecy
rate maximization problems for this secrecy network. First, we
formulate the power minimization problem based on the assump-
tion that the legitimate transmitter has perfect channel state
information (CSI) of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers,
where this problem can be reformulated into a second-order cone
program (SOCP). In addition, we provide a closed-form solution
of transmit beamforming for the scenario of an eavesdropper.
Next, we consider robust secrecy rate optimization problems
by incorporating two probabilistic channel uncertainties with
CSI feedback. By exploiting the Bernstein-type inequality and
S-Procedure to convert the probabilistic secrecy rate constraint
into the determined constraint, we formulate this secrecy rate
optimization problem into a convex optimization framework.
Furthermore, we provide analyses to show the optimal transmit
covariance matrix is rank-one for the proposed schemes. Nu-
merical results are provided to validate the performance of these
two conservative approximation methods, where it is shown that
the Bernstein-type inequality based approach outperforms the S-
Procedure approach in terms of the achievable secrecy rates.
Index Terms—MISO system, physical-layer secrecy, secrecy
capacity, convex optimization, robust optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has recently become an emerging
technique to complement and significantly improve the com-
munication security of wireless networks. This technique is
a fundamentally different paradigm compared to the con-
ventional cryptographic approaches, where secrecy capacity
is achieved by exploiting the physical layer properties of
the communication system [1]. The concept of physical-
layer security was originally developed for wiretap channels
in [2], and has recently been recognized as a promising
technique to establish secured data transmission between legit-
imate transceivers in wireless communications [3]–[6]. Multi-
antenna techniques have been exploited to secrecy transmis-
sion due to their extra spatial degrees of freedom, where the
secrecy capacity for multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO)
channels with multiple eavesdroppers has been presented in
[7]. The achievable secrecy rates in multi-antenna wiretap
channels are constrained by the information rates achieved by
the eavesdroppers. In order to improve the secrecy capacity,
relays and jamming nodes have been introduced in the secrecy
network, which prevents the eavesdroppers from intercepting
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the messages intended for legitimate users [8]–[11]. In addi-
tion, an artificial noise (AN) approach is also a well known
technique to confuse eavesdroppers by embedding noise in the
transmitted signal [12]–[15]. In [12], an isotropic AN scheme
has been developed using an orthogonal projection scheme,
whereas the spatially selective AN technique is investigated by
designing optimal beamformers to confuse the eavesdropper in
[14].
In general, it is not always possible to have perfect chan-
nel state information (CSI) of the legitimate user and the
eavesdropper at the transmitter due to channel estimation and
quantization errors. Secrecy rate optimization problems would
be more challenging with unknown CSI at the legitimate
transmitter. Thus, the robust optimization techniques based
on channel uncertainties have been investigated in traditional
wireless system (i.e., cognitive radio networks) [16]–[20].
The relationship has been built between the MISO wiretap
channel and the MISO cognitive radio (CR) channel [21].
These robust optimization techniques have been extended
to secrecy transmission based on the worst-case scheme in
recent work [22]–[25]. In [22], an optimal and robust trans-
mit covariance matrix design has been proposed for MISO
secrecy channels with multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers.
In [23], a conservative approximation approach at low SNRs
has been presented for MIMO wiretap channels, whereas a
robust beamforming technique has been developed for MIMO
wiretap channels based on an AN approach in [14], [26]. Apart
from robust secrecy rate maximization, the robust outage se-
crecy optimization with only statistical knowledge of channel
uncertainties known has been considered in [27], [28]. The
robust outage secrecy rate optimization for MIMO wiretap
channel has been investigated in [27], where a Bernstein-type
inequality based Taylor series approximation was presented for
the nonconvex outage secrecy rate constraint, while in [28], the
outage probability minimization problem of a MISO wiretap
channel has been investigated for a target secrecy rate based on
the assumption that the only distribution of the eavesdropper’s
channel error is available at the transmitter.
In this paper, we consider a MISO secrecy network, where
a transmitter establishes a secured communication link with a
legitimate receiver in the presence of multiple multi-antenna
eavesdroppers. For this secrecy network, we solve the follow-
ing secrecy rate optimization problems:
• Secrecy rate optimization based on perfect CSI: We con-
sider a secrecy rate optimization problem based on perfect
CSI, in which the transmit power is minimized subject
to the secrecy rate constraint. Motivated by [22], we
formulate this problem into a second-order cone program
(SOCP). In addition, a closed-form solution for a scenario
with a single eavesdropper of this power minimization
problem is derived based on Lagrange dual method and
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
• Secrecy rate optimization based on imperfect CSI: In the
previous optimization framework, we have solved the se-
crecy rate optimization problem based on the assumption
that the transmitter has perfect CSI of the legitimate user
and the eavesdroppers. However, in a practical scenario,
perfect CSI of the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers
might not be available at the legitimate transmitter due
to channel estimation and quantization errors. Therefore,
we present robust secrecy rate optimization techniques.
Unlike the robust secrecy rate optimization in [22], where
the imperfect CSI is formulated as a deterministic model
with bounded errors, in this paper, more general statistical
channel uncertainty models considering imperfect CSI
of both the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are
provided due to unavailable error bounds. Based on these
channel uncertainty models, we consider the secrecy
rate optimization problems (i.e., power minimization and
outage secrecy rate maximization) with probabilistic con-
straints. These optimization problems are not convex in
terms of the transmit covariance matrix and the proba-
bilistic secrecy rate constraint. In order to make these
problems tractable, we present two conservative approxi-
mation approaches (i.e., Bernstein-type inequality and S-
Procedure) to convert these probabilistic constraints into
deterministic ones. Based on these approximations, the
problems can be reformulated into convex optimization
frameworks correspondingly. Furthermore, the optimality
of these approaches are proved by investigating the rank-
one property of the optimal transmit covariance matrices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
system model is described in Section II. Secrecy rate
optimization problems based on perfect CSI are solved in
Section III, whereas the solutions for robust secrecy rate
optimization with two types of channel uncertainty models
are provided in Section IV. Section V provides simulation
results to validate the performance of the proposed algorithms.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
A. Notations
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and
lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·)T and (·)H denote
the transpose and conjugate transpose respectively. Tr(·) and
E{·} stand for trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation
for random variables. Vec(A) is the vector obtained by stack-
ing the columns of A on top of one another and ⊗ is the Kro-
necker product. λmax(∗) represents the maximum eigenvalue,
whereas vmax(∗) denotes the eigenvector associated with the
maximum eigenvalue. A  0 indicates that A is a positive
semidefinite matrix. I and (·)−1 denote the identity matrix
with appropriate size and the inverse of a matrix respectively.
‖ · ‖2 represents the Euclidean norm of a matrix. <{·} stands
for the real part of a complex number, whereas |A| denotes
the determinant of A. [x]+ represents max{x, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO secrecy channel, where the legiti-
mate transmitter establishes a communications link with the
legitimate user equipped with single antenna in the presence
of K multi-antenna eavesdroppers. It is assumed that the
legitimate transmitter is equipped with NT transmit antennas,
whereas the legitimate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper
consist of single and NE,k receive antennas, respectively. The
channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and the
legitimate receiver as well as the k-th eavesdropper are denoted
by hs ∈ CNT×1 and He,k ∈ CNT×NE,k , respectively. The
received signal at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
can be written as
ys=h
H
s x + ns, ye=H
H
e,kx + ne,k, k = 1, ...,K,
where x ∈ CNT×1 is the signal intended to the legitimate
user. In addition, ns and ne,k are zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noises with noise variance σ2s and the covariance
matrix σ2e,kI, respectively. The transmit covariance matrix is
defined as Qs = E
{
xxH
}
. The achievable secrecy rate at the
k-th legitimate receiver is defined as
Rs,k=
[
log(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣
]+
,
∀k. (1)
III. SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION BASED ON PERFECT
CSI
In this section, we consider the power minimization problem
for a MISO secrecy channel in the presence of K multi-
antenna eavesdroppers based on perfect CSI. The power min-
imization problem for this secrecy network can be formulated
as
min
Qs0
Tr (Qs) , s.t. min
k
Rs,k≥R, ∀k, (2)
where R is the predefined secrecy rate of the legitimate
receiver. The problem in (2) is not convex due to the non-
convex secrecy rate constraint. Hence, a relaxed problem can
be formulated based on the following matrix inequality [22],
[29]:
|I + A| ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (3)
where the equality holds if and only if rank(A) = 1. Then,
the relaxed problem of (2) can be written as
min
Qs0
Tr (Qs)
s.t. 1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs ≥ 2R
[
1+Tr
(
1
σ2e,k
HHe,kQsHe,k
)]
,
∀k. (4)
Problem (4) is a semidefinite program (SDP) problem, and
the optimal solution to it has been shown to be rank-one [22].
Hence, the optimal solution to the relaxed problem (4) is easily
verified to be that of the original problem (2), which confirms
the tightness of this relaxation. Accordingly, we consider the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Due to the rank-one solution of the problem
in (4), Qs can be decomposed as Qs = wwH , and thus the
original power minimization problem for the MISO secrecy
channel can be formulated into a SOCP as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2
s.t.

1
σs
hHs w
2
R
2
σe,k
HHe,kw(
2R − 1) 12
 K 0, ∀k. (5)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I. 
The problem in (5) is a standard convex optimization
problem and can be solved by the interior point methods
[30].
Corollary 1: For a single eavesdropper scenario, the optimal
solution can be derived as
w∗ =
√
p∗v∗, v∗ =
v1
‖v1‖2 , p
∗ = λ∗(2R − 1),
λ∗ =
1
λmax(
1
σ2s
hshHs − 2Rσ2e HeHHe )
, (6)
where v1 = vmax( 1σ2s hsh
H
s − 2
R
σ2e
HeH
H
e ).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II. 
IV. ROBUST SECRECY RATE OPTIMIZATION BASED ON
STATISTICAL CHANNEL UNCERTAINTY MODELS
In the previous section, we have solved the secrecy rate
optimization problem based on the assumption that the trans-
mitter has perfect CSI of the legitimate user and the eaves-
droppers. However, in practical scenarios, perfect CSI of the
legitimate user and the eavesdroppers might not be available
at the legitimate transmitter due to channel estimation and
quantization errors. Thus, robust secrecy rate optimization has
been proposed based on the worst case secrecy rate in [22],
[23], where the channel uncertainties were formulated through
deterministic models. However, it is not possible that the le-
gitimate transmitter always obtains these deterministic models
accurately due to insufficient channel estimations. Therefore,
we solve the robust secrecy rate optimization problems with
a probabilistic secrecy rate constraint based on two statistical
channel uncertainty models in the following subsections:
A. Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we consider two secrecy rate optimization
(i.e., power minimization problem and secrecy rate maximiza-
tion problem) frameworks with a probabilistic secrecy rate
constraint. These problems can be formulated as,
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t. Pr
{
min
k
Rs,k≥R
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k, (7a)
max
Qs0
R,
s.t. Pr
{
min
k
Rs,k≥R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k,
Tr(Qs) ≤ P, (7b)
The problems in (7) can be relaxed as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t. Pr
{
log(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣≥R
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k, (8a)
max
Qs0
R,
s.t. Pr
{
log(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣≥R
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k,
Tr(Qs) ≤ P, (8b)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the maximum allowable secrecy outage
probability for the k-th eavesdropper, and P is the maximum
available transmit power.
Remark: For the robust power minimization problem, the
transmitter requires a certain amount of transmit power to
achieve the predefined secrecy rate within the required outage
probability. However, due to insufficient transmit power or due
to the extremely worse channel conditions of the main channel
than the eavesdropper’s, the robust power minimization prob-
lem (8a) with a probabilistic secrecy rate constraint might turn
out to be infeasible. To overcome this infeasibility issue, we
consider the robust secrecy rate maximization problem (8b)
subject to the same secrecy outage probability and transmit
power constraints. Similar statement has been found in [23].
Alternatively, the physical meaning of (8b) can be interpreted
as follows. Under the transmit power constraint, what the
maximum secrecy rate R is that can be achieved subject
to the (secrecy) outage probability less than 100 ρ % (i.e.,
100 ρ %-secrecy outage capacity) [3], [31]. In order to solve
(8b), we propose a two-stage algorithm. In the first stage, for
any given R that makes (8a) feasible, we solve it to obtain
the minimized transmit power. It is easily observed that the
optimum value of R in (8b) monotonically increases with
the transmit power (i.e., Tr(Qs)). In the second stage, we
update R via a bisection method [30], [32]. Hence, without
loss of generality, the remaining part of our paper only
focuses on solving (8a), which can be reformulated into a
tractable problem by employing Bernstein-type inequality or
S-Procedure, though it is non-convex.
B. Channel Uncertainty Models
In this paper, we specifically consider two statistical channel
uncertainty models: Partial and full statistical channel uncer-
tainty models.
• Partial Channel Uncertainty Model: Here, it is assumed
that the legitimate transmitter can receive the channel
estimations from the eavesdroppers, however, it has only
imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper due to the limitation
of the estimation or quantization errors. Accordingly, we
can obtain the following channel uncertainty model:
He,k = H¯e,k + Ee,k,∀k,
where H¯e,k ∈ CNT×NE,k is the estimated CSI of the k-
th eavesdropper, and vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN (0,Re,k) are the
corresponding statistical errors, where Re,k is a positive
semidefinite (PSD) matrix ( 0).
• Full Channel Uncertainty Model: In this case, we con-
sider the channel uncertainty model in which we model
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers as be-
ing imperfect. The actual channels between the legitimate
transmitter and the legitimate receiver as well as the k-th
eavesdropper can be modelled respectively as
hs = h¯s + es,
He,k = H¯e,k + Ee,k,∀k,
where h¯s ∈ CNT×1, H¯e,k ∈ CNT×NE,k are the estimated
CSI, and es ∼ CN (0,Rs), vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN (0,Re,k) are
the corresponding statistical errors. In addition, Rs and
Re,k are PSD matrices (i.e., Rs  0, Re,k  0).
C. Robust Power Minimization Based on Partial Statistical
Channel Uncertainty Models
In this subsection, we consider the power minimization
problem based on the assumption of imperfect CSI only for
the eavesdroppers, where we apply two conservative refor-
mulation approaches utilizing a Bernstein-type inequality and
S-Procedure to transform the probability constraint into a
deterministic one. We rewrite the original problem based on
partial channel uncertainty model as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t.Pr
{
log(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ 1σ2e,kHHe,kQsHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣≥R
}
≥1−ρ,He,k=H¯e,k+Ee,k, vec(Ee,k) ∼ CN (0,Re,k), ∀k.
(9)
The above problem is not convex in terms of the probabilistic
constraint of the secrecy rate. By considering the inequality in
(3), the secrecy rate probability constraint can be relaxed as
follows:
Pr
{
Tr(HHe,kQsHe,k)≤
σ2e,k
2R
(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−σ2e,k
}
≥1−ρ,
He,k=H¯e,k+Ee,k, vec(Ee,k)∼CN (0,Re,k), ∀k. (10)
The left hand side (LHS) of the constraint in (10) cannot be
solved in terms of a closed-form expression. Thus, we consider
the following reformulation for this probabilistic constraint.
From the following matrix identities,
Vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗A)Vec(X), (11a)
Tr(ATB) = Vec(A)TVec(B), (11b)
(A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT . (11c)
The constraint in (10) can be expressed as follows:
Pr
{
eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k+2<{eHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+¯hHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k≤ck
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k, (12)
where ck =
σ2e,k
2R
(1 + 1σ2s
hHs Qshs) − σ2e,k, h¯e,k = vec(H¯e,k)
and ee,k = vec(Ee,k). Since ee,k ∼ CN (0,Re,k), we have
the following transformation
ee,k = R
1
2
e,kve,k, (13)
where ve,k ∼ CN (0, I). Thus, the constraint in (12) can be
equivalently reformulated as
Pr
{
vHe,k
[
−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
ve,k+2<
(
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]
)
+[ck−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≥0
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k. (14)
1) Robust Power Minimization Based on Bernstein-Type
Inequality: In order to make this probabilistic constraint more
tractable, we consider the following Bernstein-Type inequality
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 [33]: For any (A,u, c), where A ∈ CN×N is a
complex hermitian matrix, u ∈ CN×1, x ∼ CN (0, IN ) and
ρ ∈ (0, 1], the following inequalities hold:
Pr{xHAx + 2<[xHu] + c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ, (15)
⇐

Tr(A)−√−2 ln(ρ)w + ln(ρ)y + c ≥ 0∥∥∥∥ [ vec(A)√2u
] ∥∥∥∥ ≤ w
yIN + A  0
(16)
where w and y are slack variables. The equations in (16) are
jointly convex in terms of A, w and y. Based on Lemma 1,
the constraint in (14) can be reformulated into the following
form:
Tr
[
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
+
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk−ln(ρ)yk
− σ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr[hshHs Qs]+h¯
H
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k≤σ2e,k(
1
2R
−1), (17a)∥∥∥∥[ vec(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k)√
2(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k)
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤ wk, (17b)
ykI−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k0, yk≥0, ∀k. (17c)
According to (17), the power minimization in (9) can be
equivalently formulated as
min
Qs
Tr(Qs), s.t. (17), Qs  0. (18)
The problem in (18) is convex and can be solved efficiently
by using the interior-point method [34]. In order to guarantee
the optimal solution Qs of the problem in (18) is also the
optimal solution to the original power minimization problem
in (9), we have the following proposition to exploiting
the rank-one property of the solution Qs under the some
conditions:
Proposition 2: Provided that the problem in (9) is feasible,
the relaxed problem defined in (18) yields a rank-one solution
based on some restricted conditions.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III. 
2) Robust Power Minimization Based on S-Procedure:
In this subsection, we consider another conservative refor-
mulation for the probabilistic constraint of the robust power
minimization based on S-Procedure. In order to set the channel
uncertainty regions for (14), the following Lemma is required:
Lemma 2 [35]: Provided a set S ⊂ CN×1 with Pr{v ∈ S} ≥
1 − ρ such that ∀v ∈ S,vHAv + 2<{vHu} + c ≥ 0, we
equivalently obtain
Pr{vHAv + 2<{vHu}+ c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ (19)
From Lemma 2, given the following deterministic quadratic
constraint
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k]ve,k+2<{vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]}
+(ck−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k) ≥ 0,∀k, (20)
such that ve,k belongs to the following set
S = {ve,k|Pr(vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k) ≥ 1− ρ},∀k. (21)
Since ve,k ∼ CN (0, INE,kNT ), it can be easily verified
that ‖ve‖2 is a Chi-square random variable with degrees of
freedom (DoF) 2NE,kNT . The probability of the event in (20)
with channel uncertainty regions in (21) is 1−ρ, thus,the chan-
nel uncertainty region always holds for γe,k =
√
F−1(1−ρ)
2 ,
where F−1(a) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution
function of the Chi-square random variable at a. Thus, the
probabilistic constraint can be equivalently reformulated into
the following inequalities:
vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k]ve,k+2<{vHe,k[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]}
+(ck−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k) ≥ 0,
−vHe,kve,k + γ2e,k ≥ 0.
In order to incorporate the channel uncertainties in the robust
optimization framework, we consider the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (S-Procedure) [36]: Let fk(x), k = 1, 2, be defined
as
fk(x) = x
HAkx + 2<
{
bHk x
}
+ ck, (22)
where Ak = AHk ∈ Cn×n, bk ∈ Cn×1 and ck ∈ R. The
implication f1(x) ≥ 0 =⇒ f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if
there exists µ ≥ 0 such that[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
− µ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
 0, (23)
provided there exists a point x˜ with f1 (x˜) > 0.
By exploiting S-Procedure, the power minimization in (9) can
be reformulated as follows:
min
Qs,λk
Tr(Qs)
s.t.
[
λkI−[R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k] −R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k tk−λkγ2e,k
]
 0,
Qs  0, λk ≥ 0,∀k, (24)
where tk = ( 12R − 1)σ2e,k+
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
hHs Qshs−hHe,k(I⊗Qs)he,k.
The relaxed problem in (24) is a semidefinite programming
(SDP) and can be solved efficiently by using convex optimiza-
tion software [34]. Similarly, we also show that the optimal
solution to the relaxed problem in (24) is the solution to the
original problem in (9) by using the following lemma:
Proposition 3: Provided that the relaxed problem in (24) is
feasible such that Rs,k > 0 (∀k), the optimal solution of this
problem always returns rank-one.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix IV. 
D. Robust Power Minimization Based on Full Channel Un-
certainty Model
In the previous section, we investigated the robust secrecy
rate optimization based on the partial channel uncertainty
model. Now we study a more challenging model with the
imperfect CSI of the legitimate receiver as well as that of
the eavesdroppers. Comparing with the previous model, in
which the probabilistic constraint of the secrecy rate consists
of only one CSI error, it is more difficult to handle the
probabilistic constraint of the secrecy rate in terms of the
channel estimation errors of both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdroppers. According to this framework, the original
robust power minimization problem in (8a) can thus be re-
expressed as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs),
s.t.Pr
{
log(1+
1
σ2s
hHs Qshs)−log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ 1σ2e,kHe,kQsHHe,k
∣∣∣∣∣≥R
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k. (25)
Based on this full channel uncertainty model, we aim to
solve the robust power minimization problem in (25) by
converting the probabilistic constraint into a deterministic one
by exploiting the Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure.
1) Robust Power Minimization Based on Bernstein-Type
Inequality: In this subsection, we employ the Bernstein-Type
inequality to tackle the secrecy rate probabilistic constraint in
(25), which can be modified by using the matrix inequality in
(3) and (11) as follows:
Pr
{
1
σ2s
[
eHs Qses + 2<{eHs Qsh¯s}+ h¯Hs Qsh¯s
]
− 2
R
σ2e,k
[
eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k+2<{eHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+¯hHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
]
≥2R − 1
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k. (26)
The above probability constraint can be written in matrix form
as follows:
Pr
{
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
H
+2<
{
[eHs , e
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H
}
+[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H≥2R − 1
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k. (27)
In order to transform the above constraint based on the
Bernstein-type inequality as described in Subsection IV-C, we
rewrite the CSI errors of the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper as es = R
1
2
s vs, and ee,k = R
1
2
e,kve,k, respectively,
where vs ∼ CN (0, INT ) and ve,k ∼ CN (0, INTNe,k), and set
vk = [v
H
s ,v
H
e,k]
H , ∀k. Thus, this probability constraint can
be reformulated as
Pr
{
vHk Akvk + 2<{vHk uk}+ ck ≥ 0
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀k, (28)
where
Ak=
[ 1
σ2s
R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
,
uk=
[ 1
σ2s
R
1
2
s Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H ,
ck=[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
[ 1
σ2s
Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
(I⊗Qs)
]
[h¯Hs , h¯
H
e,k]
H+1− 2R.
By applying Lemma 1, the constraint in (28) can be expressed
as
Tr(Ak)−
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk+ln(ρ)yk+ck ≥ 0, (29a)∥∥∥∥[ vec(Ak)√2uk
]∥∥∥∥
2
≤ wk, (29b)
ykI + Ak  0, yk ≥ 0,∀k. (29c)
Thus, replacing the constraints (26) with (29), the power
minimization problem (25) can be equivalently written as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs), s.t. (29), ∀k. (30)
The problem in (30) is a convex problem, and can be solved
by using interior point methods. With more complex structure
of the relaxed problem in (30), it is more challenging to
directly prove a rank-one solution of Qs. However, the
following proposition guarantees a rank-one solution.
Proposition 4: Provided that the problem in (25) is feasible,
the relaxed problem (30) yields a rank-one solution under
some restricted conditions.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix V. 
2) Robust Power Minimization Based on S-Procedure:
In this subsection, we consider another conservative refor-
mulation for the probabilistic constraint of the robust power
minimization based on S-Procedure given a full channel un-
certainty model. This optimization problem can be rewritten
as
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. Pr
{
1
σ2s
(h¯Hs Qsh¯s+2<{eHs Qsh¯s}+eHs Qses)
− 2
R
σ2e,k
[h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k+2<{ee,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+eHe,k(I⊗Qs)ee,k]≥2R−1
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k. (31)
In order to relax the probabilistic constraint in (31) into a
deterministic one, we consider es = R
1
2
s vs and ee,k =
R
1
2
e,kve,k, respectively, where vs ∼ CN (0, INT ) and ve,k ∼
CN (0, INTNE,k), and thus (31) can be reformulated as fol-
lows:
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. Pr
{
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs+2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+h¯Hs Qsh¯s)
− 2
R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k+2<{vHe,kR
1
2
s (I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≥2R−1
}
≥1−ρ, ∀k. (32)
From [37], the channel uncertainty regions are equivalently
defined as follows:
⇒ Rs={vs :vHs vs≤γ2s}, Re,k={ve,k :vHe,kve,k≤γ2e,k}, (33)
where γs =
√
F−1s (1−ρ)
2 and γe,k =
√
F−1e (1−ρ)
2 ; F
−1
s and
F−1e are the inverse cumulative density function (CDF) of
the Chi-squared distributed variables with degrees of freedom
(DoF) 2NT and 2NTNE,k, respectively. Thus, we can obtain
the following derivations,
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t.
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs+2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+h¯Hs Qsh¯s)
− 2
R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k+2<{vHe,kR
1
2
s (I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+¯hHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≥2R−1,
vHs vs ≤ γ2s , vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k, ∀k. (34)
The worst-case optimization framework is developed based on
the following reformulations:
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. ts−te,k≥2R−1,
1
σ2s
(vHs R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s vs+2<{vHs R
1
2
s Qsh¯s}+h¯Hs Qsh¯s)≥ ts,
2R
σ2e,k
[vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,kve,k+2<{vHe,kR
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k}
+¯hHe,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k]≤ te,k,
vHs vs ≤ γ2s , vHe,kve,k ≤ γ2e,k, ∀k, (35)
where ts > 0 and te,k > 0 are slack variables for the achieved
rate of the legitimate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper,
respectively. By exploiting S-Procedure in Lemma 3, the
problem can be reformulated in (36) on the top of the next
page. This reformulated problem is a SDP, and can be solved
efficiently by the interior-point method, and the following
proposition is provided to show that the optimal solution of
(36) is rank-one:
Proposition 5: The optimal solution to problem (36) can be
proven to be rank-one provided that problem (25) is feasible.
Proof : Please refer to appendix VI. 
min
Qs0
Tr(Qs)
s.t. ts−te,k≥2R−1, (36a)
Ts=
µsI+ 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s 1σ2s R 12s Qsh¯s
1
σ2s
h¯Hs QsR
1
2
s
1
σ2s
h¯Hs Qsh¯s−ts−µsγ2s ,
0, (36b)
Te,k=
µkI− 2Rσ2e,kR 12e,k(I⊗Qs)R 12e,k − 2Rσ2e,kR 12e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
− 2R
σ2e,k
h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k te,k− 2
R
σ2e,k
h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k−µe,kγ2e,k
0, (36c)
µs≥0, µe,k≥0, ∀k. (36d)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to validate
the theoretical results derived in previous sections. In order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, we
consider a MISO secrecy channel with multiple multi-antenna
eavesdroppers, which consists of one multi-antenna legitimate
transmitter, one single-antenna legitimate receiver and three
multi-antenna eavesdroppers. In addition, the legitimate trans-
mitter has five antennas (i.e., NT = 5), and each eavesdropper
is equipped with three antennas (i.e., NE,k = 3, ∀k). The
transmit power is assumed to be 10 dB unless specified.
Moreover, all of the channels are generated using zero-mean
circularly symmetric independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) complex Gaussian random variables, and the noise
power at the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are assumed
to be one (i.e., σ2s = σ
2
e,k = 1). The outage probabilities are
set to be ρ = 0.05.
A. Power Minimization Based on Perfect CSI
In this subsection, we provide simulation results to validate
the closed form solution derived in (6) for the special case
of one legitimate user and one multi-antenna eavesdropper .
In addition, the original power minimization problem can be
formulated into a SOCP framework. We obtain the required
transmit power by solving the SOCP, the SDP and closed-
form expression for five different channels as shown in Table
I where the target secrecy rate is set to be 2. From this table,
it can be observed that these three results are the same, which
validate the closed-form solution and the SOCP formulation.
Channels Closed-form Convex optimizationSOCP SDP in [22]
Channel 1 1.8081 1.8081 1.8081
Channel 2 1.4943 1.4943 1.4943
Channel 3 1.1292 1.1292 1.1292
Channel 4 0.6896 0.6896 0.6896
Channel 5 1.6659 1.6659 1.6659
TABLE I: The transmit power from closed-form solution and
convex optimization framework.
B. Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization with Partial Channel
Uncertainties
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed robust secrecy rate optimization by exploiting channel
uncertainties of the eavesdroppers. Here, the eavesdroppers’
CSI error covariance matrices have been assumed to be
Re,k = ε
2
e,kI, where ε
2
e,k represents the channel error variance
of the k-th eavesdropper. It is assumed the channel error
variance ε2e,k = 0.01 or 0.04 unless specified.
Fig. 1 shows the cumulative density function (CDF) of the
achieved secrecy rate for the secrecy rate optimization prob-
lem, where the target secrecy rate is set to be 1. From
this result, one can observe that the Bernstein-type inequality
based scheme can satisfy the outage constraint, whereas the
S-Procedure based scheme has a small proportion of the
achieved secrecy rates that cannot satisfy the outage constraint
since approximately 10 % of the secrecy rates are below the
target secrecy rate. Fig. 2 represents the achieved secrecy rate
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Fig. 1: The CDF of secrecy rate with partial channel uncertainties.
performance of these two robust proposed schemes based on
partial channel uncertainties with different transmit powers,
where these achieved secrecy rates increase with the transmit
power, and the Bernstein-type inequality based scheme has
a better performance than S-Procedure based scheme. The
achieved secrecy rate performance of these two robust pro-
posed schemes based on partial channel uncertainties with
different error variances (i.e., ε2e,k) is plotted in Fig. 3. As
seen in this result, the achieved secrecy rates of both robust
proposed schemes and the worst-case scheme decrease with
increasing error variance. Additionally, both robust proposed
scheme outperform the worst-case scheme.
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Fig. 2: The secrecy rate with different transmit powers based on
partial channel uncertainties.
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Fig. 3: The secrecy rate with different error variance based on
partial channel uncertainties.
C. Robust Secrecy Rate Optimization with Full Channel Un-
certainties
Next, we provide simulation results to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the robust secrecy rate optimization based on the
full channel uncertainty model, where the CSI of both the
legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are not available at the
legitimate transmitter. The CSI error covariance matrices have
been assumed to be Rs = ε2sI, Re,k = ε
2
e,kI, where ε
2
s and
ε2e,k represent the channel error variances of the legitimate
user and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. Here, we set the
channel error variances as ε2s = ε
2
e,k = 0.01, 0.04 or 0.1.
We show the CDF of the achieved secrecy rate for the
secrecy rate optimization problem in Fig. 4, where the target
secrecy rate is set to be 1, and the Bernstein-type inequality
based scheme can satisfy the outage constraint since the
approximately 5 % of the achieved secrecy rates are below the
target secrecy rate. However, the S-Procedure based scheme
has approximately 10 % of the achieved secrecy rates and
cannot satisfy the outage constraint, which is under the pre-
defined secrecy rate. Fig. 5 represents the achieved secrecy
rate performance of these two robust proposed schemes based
on full channel uncertainties (i.e., ε2s = ε
2
e,k = 0.01, 0.04
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Fig. 4: The CDF of secrecy rate with full channel uncertainties.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.5
1
1.5
2
Transmit power (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 
 
 Bernstein−type inequality
S−Procedure
ε
s
2
 = ε
e,k
2
 = 0.01
ε
s
2
 = ε
e,k
2
 = 0.04
ε
s
2
 = ε
e,k
2
 = 0.1
Fig. 5: The secrecy rate with different transmit powers based on
full channel uncertainties.
or 0.1) with different transmit powers, where these achieved
secrecy rates increase with transmit power, and the Bernstein-
type inequality based scheme outperforms that of S-Procedure.
The achieved secrecy rate performance of these two robust
proposed schemes based on full channel uncertainties with
different error variances is shown in Fig. 6. As seen in this
result, the achieved secrecy rates of the proposed schemes and
the worst-case schemes decrease with error variance. In addi-
tion, the Bernstein-type inequality based scheme outperforms
the S-Procedure based scheme and the worst-case scheme.
Moreover, the achieved secrecy rate versus the number of the
eavesdroppers (i.e., K) is shown in Fig. 7. It is observed from
this result that the achieved secrecy rate decreases as more
eavesdroppers are in the presence. In addition, Bernstein-type
inequality based scheme outperforms the S-Procedure based
one in terms of the achieved secrecy rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied different secrecy rate op-
timization techniques for a MISO secrecy channel. We first
formulated the power minimization into a SOCP framework
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Fig. 6: The secrecy rate with different error variances based on full
channel uncertainties.
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for the case of a single legitimate user and multiple eavesdrop-
pers, and derived a closed-form solution for the scenario with
only one eavesdropper. In addition, the robust secrecy rate op-
timization problems with secrecy rate probabilistic constraints
have been presented by incorporating two different statistical
channel uncertainties. The original secrecy rate optimization
problems were not convex in terms of the probabilistic con-
straint. In order to make the original problems tractable, we
considered two conservative approximation approaches (i.e.,
Bernstein-type inequality and S-Procedure) to convert this
probabilistic constraint into a deterministic one. Besides, we
investigate the rank-one property of the optimal solution for
our proposed robust schemes. Simulation results have been
provided to validate the performance of the proposed schemes
for different scenarios.
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APPENDIX I: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, due to the rank-one solution of the problem in (4), we
can equivalently obtain
min
w
‖w‖22
s.t.
1 + 1σ2s
wHhsh
H
s w
1 + 1
σ2e,k
wHHe,kHHe,kw
≥ 2R,∀k. (37)
Then, the above problem can be modified as follows:
min
w
‖w‖22
s.t.
2R
σ2e,k
‖HHe,kw‖2+(2R − 1)≤
1
σ2s
|hHs w|2,∀k. (38)
From the following inequality relations[
x
y
]
K 0,⇔ ‖y‖2 ≤ x. (39)
The original power minimization problem in (2) can be
formulated into a SOCP problem as in (5).
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
APPENDIX II: PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
First, we rewrite the problem (37) for only one eavesdropper
using the equation w =
√
pv as
min
p,v
pvHv, s.t.
vH(I + pσ2s
hsh
H
s )v
vH(I + pσ2e
HeHHe )v
≥ 2R,
vHv = 1, p ≥ 0. (40)
In order to solve this problem, we consider the Lagrange dual
problem of (37), which can be written as,
L(w, λ) = wHw + λ2R(1 +
1
σ2e
wHHeH
H
e w)
− λ(1 + 1
σ2s
wHhsh
H
s w)
= wH
(
I +
1
σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s
)
w
+ λ
(
2R − 1) , (41)
where λ is non-negative Lagrangian multiplier. The corre-
sponding dual problem is defined as follows:
max
λ
λ
(
2R − 1)
s.t. Z , I + 1
σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s  0,
λ ≥ 0. (42)
In order to show the strong duality between the problem in (37)
and its dual problem, the Hessian matrix of the Lagrangian of
the problem in (37) is derived as follows:
∇wwH = I +
1
σ2e
λ2RHeH
H
e −
1
σ2s
λhsh
H
s . (43)
The strong duality holds between the primal problem and its
dual problem provided the Hessian is a positive semidefinite
matrix [38]. This will be satisfied provided that the original
problem in (37) is feasible, which implies that the strong
duality holds between the original problem (37) and its dual
problem. Thus, we can derive the optimal λ∗ from the positive
semidefinite constraint in (42) as follows:
λ∗ =
1
λmax(
1
σ2s
hshHs − 2Rσ2e HeHHe )
. (44)
Note that the above equation can be obtained based on the fact
Tr(A) ≥ λmax(A). Thus, we can obtain the minimum power
as
p∗ = λ∗(2R − 1). (45)
In addition, the optimal w lies in the null space of Z, thus
v1 = vmax(
1
σ2s
hsh
H
s −
2R
σ2e
HeH
H
e ), v =
v1
‖v1‖2 . (46)
This completes the proof of Corollary 1. 
APPENDIX III: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first rewrite the relaxed power minimization problem as
follows:
min
Qs
Tr(Qs),
s.t. Tr
[
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
]
+
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk−ln(ρ)yk
− σ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr(hshHs Qs)+h¯
H
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k≤σ2e,k(
1
2R
−1),
(47a)∥∥∥∥∥
[
vec(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k)√
2(R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k)
]∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ wk, (47b)
ykI−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k0, (47c)
yk≥0,Qs  0,∀k,
In order to show the solution to the above problem is rank-one,
the SOCP constraint (47b) can be restrictedly given by√
‖R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k‖2F + 2‖R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k‖2
≤
√
‖R 12e,k(I⊗Qs)‖2F (‖R
1
2
e,k‖2F+2‖h¯e,k‖2)
≤
√
Tr[(I⊗Qs)(I⊗Qs)H ]
√
Tr2(Re,k)+2Tr(Re,k)‖h¯e,k‖2
≤wk,⇒Tr[(I⊗Qs)(I⊗Qs)H ]l2k≤w2k, (48)
where lk =
√
Tr2(Re,k) + 2Tr(Re,k)‖h¯e,k‖2. By exploiting
Tr[(A ⊗ B)(C ⊗ D)] = Tr(AB ⊗ CD), Tr(A ⊗ B) =
Tr(A)Tr(B) and (A⊗B)T = AT ⊗BT , we can obtain
l2kNE,kTr(QsQ
H
s ) ≤ w2k,
⇒ λmax(QsQHs ) ≤ Tr(QsQHs ) ≤
w2k
l2kNE,k
,
⇒ QsQHs  t2kI, ⇒ Sk=
[
tkI Qs
QHs tkI
]
 0, (49)
where t2k =
w2k
l2kNE,k
. Thus, the constraint in (49) can be
rewritten into the following linear matrix inequality (LMI):[
tkI Qs
QHs tkI
]
 0,⇒
[
tkI 0
0H tkI
]
+
[
0 Qs
QHs 0
]
 0,[
tkI 0
0H tkI
]

[
I
0
]
Qs
[
0 −I ]+[ 0−I
]
QHs
[
I 0
]
,
‖Qs‖ ≤ tk. (50)
In order to further reformulate the above LMI, we consider
the following lemma:
Lemma 4: (Nemirovski lemma) [39]: For a given set of matrices
A = AH , B and C, the following LMI is satisfied:
A  BXC + CHXHB, ‖X‖ ≤ t, (51)
if and only if there exists non-negative real numbers a such
that [
A− aCHC −tBH
−tB aI
]
 0. (52)
By applying Lemma 4 to the LMI in (50), we can obtain
Sk=
[ tkI 00 tkI
]
−a1
[
0
−I
] [
0 −I ] −tk [ I0
]
−tk
[
I 0
]
a1I
0.
(53)
From (53), we claim that constraint (49) can be equivalently
rewritten without Qs. In order to prove rank-one of the
power minimization problem, we consider the Lagrangian
dual function of (47), which can be expressed in (54) on
the top of the next page, where Z, λk and Ck are dual
variables associated with Qs, (47a) and (47c), respectively. In
addition, H(n,n)k ∈ HNT×NT+ and T(n,n)e,k ∈ HNT×NT+ are block
submatrices of Re,k+h¯e,kh¯He,k and R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k, respectively,
and can be expressed specifically as follows:
Re,k + h¯e,kh¯
H
e,k =

H
(1,1)
k · · · H(1,NE,k)k
...
. . .
...
H
(NE,k,1)
k · · · H(NE,k,NE,k)k
 (55)
and
R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k =

T
(1,1)
e,k · · · T(1,NE,k)e,k
...
. . .
...
T
(NE,k,1)
e,k · · · T(NE,k,NE,k)e,k
 (56)
We consider parts of the KKT conditions related to the proof
∂L
∂Qs
=0, (57a)
ZQs=0, (57b)
Qs0, Z0, λk≥0, Ck  0,∀k. (57c)
According to the KKT condition in (57a), we have
I−Z+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k −thshHs +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k =0,(58)
where t =
∑K
k=1
λkσ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
. Postmultiplying the two sides of (58)
by Qs, and based on (57b), we have(
I+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs= thsh
H
s Qs,(59)
From (59), we claim that there is at least one λk, ∀k such
that λk > 0, which is shown by contradiction. If all λk = 0
L(Qs,Z, λk,Ck) = Tr(Qs)− Tr(ZQs) +
K∑
k=1
λk
[
Tr[(Re,k + h¯e,kh¯He,k)(I⊗Qs)]−
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr(hshHs Qs)
+
√
−2 ln(ρ)wk−ln(ρ)yk−σ2e,k(
1
2R
− 1)
]
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Ck
(
ykI−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
)]
= Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkTr(H
(n,n)
k Qs)−
K∑
k=1
λkσ
2
e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr(hshHs Qs)+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
Tr[T(n,n)e,k Qs]. (54)
for ∀k, then t = 0⇒
(
I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs = 0 (c.f.
(59)) such that Qs = 0 due to I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 T
(n,n)
e,k  0,
which implies that the legitimate transmitter does not send
any information to the legitimate receiver. Thus, we claim
that there exists at least one λk > 0 such that t > 0 holds.
According to (59), the following relation of rank holds:
rank(Qs)=rank
[(
I+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λkH
(n,n)
k +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
T
(n,n)
e,k
)
Qs
]
= rank(thshHs Qs)≤min{rank(thshHs ), rank(Qs)}≤1. (60)
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
APPENDIX IV: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Here, we provide the proof for the rank-one solution of the
power minimization problem in (24). The first step is to re-
express the Lagrangian function of (24) as follows:
L(Qs,Z,Yk) = Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)−
K∑
k=1
Tr(YkAk), (61)
where
Ak =
[
λkI+[−R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k] −R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k tk−λkγ2e,k
]
,
in addition, Z and Yk are the dual variables associated
with Qs and Ak, respectively. Then, we rewrite Ak for the
convenience of notations.
Ak=
[
λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k−λkγ2e,k
]
+
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
]
−
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
(I⊗Qs)
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
. (62)
From (62), the Lagrangian dual function can be rewrit-
ten as (63), where S(n,n)k ∈ HNT+ is a submatrix of[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
Yk
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
similar to Appendix III. Next,
we consider KKT conditions, which can be obtained as
∂L
∂Qs
= I−Z−[0 hs]T [0 hs]H+ K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k =0,
⇒ I−Z+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k =
[
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
,(64)
where T=
∑K
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Yk. Multiplying Qs by the two sides
of (64), we have(
I+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs=
[
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
Qs, (65)
From the above equality, we show that T 6= 0
by contradiction. If T = 0, then we have(
I +
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs = 0. such that Qs = 0
due to I+
∑K
k=1
∑NE,k
n=1 S
(n,n)
k  0, which violates Qs 6= 0
due to R > 0. Thus, we claim T  0, and we obtain the
rank-one relations:
rank(Qs) = rank
((
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
k
)
Qs
)
= rank
([
0 hs
]
T
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
)
≤ rank([0 hs]) ≤ 1, (66)
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 
APPENDIX V: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In order to prove the rank-one solution of (29), we first
transform this problem into the following form
min
Qs
Tr(Qs)
s.t.
1
σ2s
[Tr(h¯sh¯Hs Qs)+Tr(RsQs)]
− 2
R
σ2e,k
Tr[(h¯e,kh¯He,k+Re,k)(I⊗Qs)]+ak≥0,[
wkI fk
fHk wk
]
 0, ykINT +
1
σ2s
R
1
2
s QsR
1
2
s  0, (67a)
ykINTNE,k −
2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k  0, (67b)
where ak = 1− 2R −
√−2 ln ρwk + ln ρyk, and
fk=

vec
 1σ2s R 12s QsR 12s 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k

√
2
 1σ2s R 12s Qs 0
0 − 2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)
 [h¯Hs h¯He,k]
 . (68)
The first SDP constraints in (67a) can also be restrictedly
modified by using the similar approach as shown in Appendix
III, whilst the Hermitian matrix in the second SDP constraint
L(Qs,Z,Yk) = Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]H
(I⊗Qs)
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
])
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
[
λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k−λkγ2e,k
])
−
K∑
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr
(
Yk
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
])
=Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
Tr
(
S
(n,n)
k Qs
)
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
(
Yk
[
λkI 0
0 ( 1
2R
− 1)σ2e,k−λkγ2e,k
])
−
K∑
k=1
σ2e,k
2Rσ2s
Tr
(
Yk
[
0 hs
]H
Qs
[
0 hs
])
, (63)
is evidently positive definite as a result of its structure. Then,
we consider the Lagrange dual function of the above problem,
L(Qs,Z, λk,Bk,Ck)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(ZQs)
−
K∑
k=1
λk
(
1
σ2s
[Tr(h¯sh¯Hs Qs)+Tr(RsQs)]
− 2
R
σ2e,k
Tr[(h¯e,kh¯He,k+Re,k)(I⊗Qs)]+ak
)
−
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Ck
(
ykINTNE,k−
2R
σ2e,k
R
1
2
e,k(I⊗Qs)R
1
2
e,k
)]
, (69)
According to the relevant KKT condition,
∂L
∂Qs
= I−
K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
h¯sh¯
H
s −
K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
Rs+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
λk2
R
σ2e,k
H
(n,n)
k
+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
2R
σ2e,k
R
(n,n)
k −Z=0, (70)
where H(n,n)k ∈ HNT+ is a block submatrix of he,khHe,k +
Re,k, and R
(n,n)
k ∈ HNT+ is a block submatrix of R
1
2
e,kCkR
1
2
e,k.
Then, setting
T=I+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
2R
σ2e,k
(
λkH
(n,n)
k +R
(n,n)
k
)
−
( K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
)
Rs, (71)
we can obtain
Z = T−
( K∑
k=1
λk
σ2s
)
h¯sh¯
H
s . (72)
From (71), it is easily verified that T  0 when λk = 0,
however, λk 6= 0, as discussed in Appendix III. Thus, we only
focus on the case of λk > 0.
Setting v =
∑K
k=1
λk
σ2s
> 0, one can easily observe that T  0
and rank(vhshHs ) = 1 from (72). Letting rank(T) = rT, we
consider the following assumption:
if T  0, then this implies rT = NT , according to [40,
Lemma 5], rank(Z) ≥ NT − 1. We can claim rank(Z) 6= NT
due to Qs 6= 0. Thus, rank(Z) = NT − 1 only when
rank(Qs) = 1 due to the KKT condition ZQs = 0. Therefore,
the remaining part is to show that T  0. By exploiting
[40, Appendix D], we can conclude that T  0 such that
rank(Qs) = 1.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
APPENDIX VI: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
In order to show the rank-one solution of the problem in
(36), we rewrite Ts and Te,k as follows:
Ts = Ξs + V
H
s QsVs, (73a)
Te,k = Ξe,k −VHe,k(I⊗Qs)Ve,k, (73b)
where
Ξs=
[
µsI 0
0 −ts−µsγ2s ,
]
,Vs=
1
σs
[
R
1
2
s h¯s
]
,
Ξe,k=
[
µkI 0
0 te,k−µe,kγ2e,k
]
,Ve,k=
2
R
2
σe,k
[
R
1
2
e,k h¯e,k
]
.
Then, we consider the Lagrange dual function of (36) by
replacing (36b) and (36c) with (73a) and (73b), respectively.
L(Qs,Z,As,Ae,k, νk, λs, λe,k)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(QsZ)
−Tr(TsAs)−
K∑
k=1
Tr(Te,kAe,k)−
K∑
k=1
νk(ts−te,k−2R+1)
−λsµs−
K∑
k=1
λe,kµe,k, (74)
where Z, As, Ae,k, νk, λs and λe,k are dual variables
associated with Qs, Ts, Te,k, µs, µe,k, and (36a),
respectively. We consider the relevant KKT conditions
as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0, (75a)
QsZ = 0, (75b)
TsAs = 0, (75c)
As  0,Ae,k  0,Qs  0, λs ≥ 0. (75d)
From (75a), we have
∂L
∂Qs
= I− Z−VsAsVHs +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k = 0, (76)
where S(n,n)e,k ∈ HNT+ is a block submatrix of Ve,kAe,kVHe,k.
Ve,kAe,kV
H
e,k =

S
(1,1)
e,k · · · S(1,NE,k)e,k
...
. . .
...
S
(NE,k,1)
e,k · · · S(NE,k,NE,k)e,k
 . (77)
By pre-multiplying Qs by both sides of (76), we obtain
Qs
(
I+
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k
)
=QsVsAsV
H
s (78)
From the above equality, one can observe the following rank
relations,
rank(Qs) = rank
[
Qs
(
I +
K∑
k=1
NE,k∑
n=1
S
(n,n)
e,k
)]
= rank
(
QsVsAsV
H
s
)
. (79)
In order to prove rank(Qs) ≤ 1, we need to show that
rank(QsVsAsVHs ) ≤ 1 holds. Due to (75c), we post-multiply
VHs by the two sides of this KKT condition,
ΞsAsV
H
s +V
H
s QsVsAsV
H
s =0. (80)
As a result of the following equalities,
1
σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
Ξs=µs
(
Vs− 1
σs
[
0 h¯s
])
,
1
σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
VHs =
1
σ2s
Rs.
By pre-multiplying both sides of (80) by 1σs
[
R
1
2
s 0
]
, we
obtain
µs
(
Vs− 1
σs
[
0 h¯s
])
AsV
H
s +
1
σ2s
RsQsVsAsV
H
s =0,
⇒
(
µsI+
1
σ2s
RsQs
)
VsAsV
H
s =
µs
σs
[
0 h¯s
]
AsV
H
s . (81)
Now, we provide the following two scenarios for the equality
(81). First, we discuss the scenario when µs = 0. From (73a),
we have
Ts=
[
0 0
0 −ts
]
+VHs QsVs. (82)
Assuming that rank(VHs QsVs) = rs, it thus straightforwardly
follows from (82) that
rank(Ts) ≥ rank(VHs QsVs)− rank
[
0 0
0 ts
]
=rs−1,
⇒ rank(null(Ts))≤NT+1−(rs−1). (83)
Assuming that there exists at least one ξ that lies in the
null space of VHs QsVs such that Q
1
2
s Vsξ = 0. This as-
sumption holds true, since null(VHs QsVs) is non-empty, due
to rank(VHs QsVs) < (NT + 1). We pre-multiply ξ
H and
postmultiply ξ on both sides of (82),
ξHTsξ = ξ
H
[
0 0
0 −ts
]
ξ ≥ 0. (84)
It is easily verified that ξHTsξ = 0 due to ts > 0 and
therefore,
∀ξ ∈ null(VHs QsVs)⇒ ξ ∈ null(Ts),
⇒ null(VHs QsVs) ⊆ null(Ts). (85)
According to (85),
rank(null(VHs QsVs)) ≤ rank(null(Ts)),
⇒ rank(null(Ts)) ≥ NT + 1− rs. (86)
Combining (83) with (86), we have
NT+1−rs≤ rank(null(Ts))≤NT+1−(rs−1). (87)
Since TsAs = 0,
NT+1−rs≤ rank(As)≤NT+1−(rs−1). (88)
Accordingly, As is of the following structure:
As=
NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i +βηη
H , (αi>0,∀i, β≥0). (89)
If β = 0, then
QsVsAsV
H
s = Q
1
2
s Q
1
2
s Vs
(NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i
)
VHs
= Q
1
2
s
NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αi
(
Q
1
2
s Vsξiξ
H
i V
H
s
)
= 0. (90)
Together with (79), we obtain rank(Qs) = 0, which contra-
dicts to the optimality of the problem (8a). Therefore, we have
β > 0 and
QsVsAsV
H
s = Q
1
2
s Q
1
2
s V
H
s
(NT+1−rs∑
i=1
αiξiξ
H
i +βηη
H
)
Vs
= Q
1
2
s
(
0+βQ
1
2
s Vsηη
HVHs
)
= βQsVsηη
HVHs . (91)
One can easily observe from (91) that rank(QsVsAsVHs ) ≤
rank(ηηH) = 1.
Moreover, we provide the proof for the case of µs > 0, since
µsI +
1
σ2s
RsQs is of full-rank, according to (81),
rank(VsAsVHs )
= rank
[
µs
σs
(
µsI+
1
σ2s
RsQs
)−1[
0 h¯s
]
VsAsV
H
s
]
≤ rank
([
0 h¯s
])≤1,⇒ rank(QsVsAsVHs )≤1, (92)
which completes the proof of Proposition 5. 
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